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1. Introduction
Survey-based evidence in the US (Graham et al.,
2005) and the UK (Choi et al., 2006) shows that
meeting analyst expectations is a fundamental
earnings target. Severe stock market reactions to
negative earnings surprises and a market reward to
positive earnings surprises give managers strong
incentives to walk down analyst earnings forecasts
in order to increase the probability of hitting the
final forecast (earnings forecast guidance) or to
use their discretion over reported earnings to meet
expectations (earnings management). In this paper,
we examine whether UK firms use earnings man-
agement or forecast guidance to meet analyst ex-
pectations. In addition to the practice of accruals
management, we examine a recently explored
earnings management mechanism: inflating core
earnings through classification shifting of core ex-
penses to income-increasing (negative), non-recur-
ring items. As both managers and analysts exclude
non-recurring items from core earnings, firms may
engage in classification shifting of recurring loss-
es or expenses to inflate core earnings and meet
analyst expectations. Examining the practice of
classification shifting by UK firms is of special in-
terest, as over our study period FRS 3 Reporting
Financial Performance, which was in force for
UK firms from 1993 until the adoption of
International Financial Reporting Standards in
2005, required firms to report net income per
share, but allowed them to distinguish between
core and transitory earnings by exercising discre-
tion in classifying non-recurring items. In line with
FRS 3’s approach, IAS 1 Presentation of Financial
Statements requires a clear distinction between
core and exceptional income components, allow-
ing firms to disclose material items of an excep-
tional nature separately in the income statement.
Prior evidence does not explore fully the link be-
tween the UK regulatory framework for reporting
financial performance and the mechanisms UK
firms use to meet expectations. In their survey of
investment professionals and financial managers,
Choi et al. (2006) report a consensus view that the
general quality of earnings improved post-FRS 3
and that, while earnings forecast guidance might
be a widespread phenomenon, firms are now less
likely to use discretionary accounting choices to
meet analyst expectations. At the same time, the
survey reveals concern over the potential manipu-
lation of non-recurring items despite the increased
transparency requirements of FRS 3. The evidence
of Choi et al. (2005) that a substantial proportion
of the 500 largest UK listed non-financial firms
(over 70%) exploited the option to disclose alter-
native earnings per share (EPS) on core earnings
supports this concern. Athanasakou et al. (2007)
lend further support to this concern by document-
ing an overall increase in the practice of income
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smoothing using classifications of non-recurring
items post-FRS 3. Even though Peasnell et al.
(2000a) and Gore et al. (2007) provide preliminary
evidence consistent with UK firms using non-re-
curring items pre-FRS 3 to hit earnings bench-
marks, they do not find similar evidence for the
post-FRS 3 period. Therefore, to date there is no
direct evidence on whether UK firms use classifi-
cations of non-recurring items post-FRS 3 to hit
analyst forecasts.
In view of this discussion, we undertake an
archive-based examination of the use of accruals
management, classification shifting and earnings
forecast guidance to meet analyst expectations in
the post-FRS 3 period, 1994–2002. We constrain
our sample period to 2002 due to data unavailabil-
ity for key variables in our study post-2002. We
use logistic analysis to examine the association of
income-increasing, discretionary accruals and
downward-guided forecasts with the probability of
meeting analyst forecasts. As a proxy for discre-
tionary accruals, we use abnormal working capital
accruals (AWCAs) estimated using the modified
Jones model including lagged return on assets
(ROA) to control for operating performance
(Kothari et al., 2005). Consistent with prior re-
search (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Dechow et
al., 2000; Peasnell et al., 2000a; Das and Zhang,
2003), we focus on working capital accruals in-
stead of total accruals, as changes in working cap-
ital offer a more flexible mechanism to meet
earnings benchmarks than non-current accruals
(e.g. depreciation, amortisation, impairments). We
measure earnings forecast guidance by comparing
an estimate of the expected analyst forecast
(Matsumoto, 2002) with the last forecast for the
year made before the release of the earnings an-
nouncement. Our findings show no evidence that
firms use income-increasing AWCAs to meet ana-
lyst forecasts. Instead, we find a significant associ-
ation between earnings forecast guidance and the
probability of hitting the target. The relation per-
sists after controlling for other incentives.
To examine whether UK managers shift core ex-
penses to non-recurring items to meet analyst ex-
pectations we test the association between an
estimate of unexpected core earnings (McVay,
2006) and non-recurring items, focusing on cases
where classifications of non-recurring items allow
managers to just hit analyst forecasts. We decom-
pose total non-recurring items into non-operating
exceptional items and other non-recurring items
(i.e. operating exceptionals and other value-irrele-
vant items). We further distinguish between small
and large non-recurring items. Other and small
non-recurring items provide more latitude for clas-
sification shifting because they are less visible and
less likely to depend on the occurrence of specific
events (e.g. structural events such as mergers, ac-
quisitions, restructurings and divestitures). Our re-
sults show a significant association between
unexpected core profits and small income-increas-
ing other non-recurring items for larger firms that
would have just missed the analyst forecast with-
out these classifications. For these firms, compris-
ing around 10% of the sample,1 the unexpected
rise in core earnings appears to reverse in the sub-
sequent accounting period when small core ex-
penses recur, causing a decline in profitability.
Additional analysis shows that while for the entire
sample there is no association between non-recur-
ring items and future operating performance, small
other non-recurring items predict substantial oper-
ating cash outflows three years ahead for firms that
just hit the analyst target with these classifications.
Taken together, this evidence is consistent with a
subset of larger UK firms engaging in classifica-
tion shifting of small core expenses to other non-
recurring items to meet analyst forecasts.
Our study provides information for accounting
standard setters and contributes to the earnings
management literature in several ways. First, we
shed light on the earnings game in the UK by pro-
viding insights into the mechanisms UK firms use
to meet analyst expectations and their incentives
(e.g. relating to other earnings benchmarks, the
value-relevance of earnings, litigation risk, growth
and size). We find that post-FRS 3 UK firms did
not use abnormal working capital accruals to meet
analyst expectations. This corroborates survey ev-
idence of Graham et al. (2005) and Choi et al.
(2006) that managers are generally less likely to
employ discretionary accounting adjustments to
hit analyst forecasts. Also, using a proxy that cap-
tures both formal guidance (e.g. public disclo-
sures) and informal guidance (e.g. through private
conversations), we show that UK firms guide ana-
lyst forecasts down to meet analyst expectations.
This evidence is consistent with the views of in-
vestment professionals and financial managers
that earnings forecast guidance is a widespread
practice in the UK (Choi et al., 2006).
Second, this is the first study to explicitly exam-
ine the possibility that UK firms shifted core ex-
penses to non-recurring items post-FRS 3 to
increase core earnings and hit the final forecast.
McVay (2006) examines classification shifting by
US firms using special items. Our evidence shows
that even though classification shifting is not a
common practice, managers of some larger firms
may shift small core expenses to operating excep-
tional and other non-recurring items to inflate core
earnings and hit the final forecast. This evidence
justifies concerns over potential misclassifications
4 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
1 These are 121 large firms with average total assets of
£1,043m, average total sales of £1,426m and average market
capitalisation of £1,576m.
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of non-recurring items to meet earnings targets,
despite the increased transparency requirements of
FRS 3.
Third, our study adds to recent research examin-
ing adjusted earnings reporting in the UK (Walker
and Louvari, 2003; Choi et al., 2005; Choi et al.,
2007). Over the entire sample we find no associa-
tion between non-recurring items and future oper-
ating performance. Consistent with prior evidence,
these results suggest that, on average, UK firms
classify transitory income components below core
earnings. The only evidence consistent with mis-
classified non-recurring items relates to the subset
of larger firms that would have just missed the
final forecast without classifications of small other
non-recurring items.
2. Prior research
2.1. US evidence
In their survey of US chief financial officers,
Graham et al. (2005) find that analyst expectations
and prior earnings are managers’ two most impor-
tant earnings benchmarks. Strong stock market re-
actions to small negative earnings surprises
suggest that investors view a missed target as sig-
nalling a substantial decline in underlying per-
formance. Conversely, investors view a zero or
positive earnings surprise as evidence of a well-
managed firm, able to both predict and deliver fu-
ture earnings. Archival research corroborates this
evidence. Skinner and Sloan (2002) and Brown
(2003) document adverse market reactions for
firms that just fail to meet expectations. Bartov et
al. (2002) and Kasznik and McNichols (2002) find
that firms that meet analyst expectations earn a
market reward that is positively associated with fu-
ture performance. Doyle et al. (2006) show that
this market reward is robust to other risk factors
and previously documented market anomalies that
affect variation in returns. Comparing the market
penalty for missing analyst expectations to the pre-
mium for achieving analyst expectations, Lopez
and Rees (2002) find that the former is significant-
ly higher than the latter and that firms that consis-
tently achieve analyst forecasts have a significantly
higher earnings response coefficient. Measuring
stock sensitivity by outstanding stock recommen-
dations, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b) find that
firms rated with a buy recommendation are more
likely to inflate earnings to meet or slightly exceed
analyst expectations. In addition to capital market
consequences, evidence of Graham et al. (2005)
suggests that managerial concerns over job securi-
ty and reputation offer a strong incentive to
achieve analyst expectations.
The importance of analyst forecasts as an earn-
ings target appears to have risen over the last
decade. Even though in the initial evaluation of the
hierarchy of earnings targets by Degeorge et al.
(1999) analyst expectations had the lowest rank,
Brown and Caylor (2005) find that from the mid-
1990s managers sought to avoid negative earnings
surprises more than to avoid reporting losses or
earnings decreases. The authors rationalise the
switch in the target hierarchy by reporting evi-
dence of a significantly higher reward (penalty) for
achieving (missing) analyst expectations than for
achieving (missing) the other two earnings targets.
They attribute the higher premium to temporal in-
creases in the accuracy and the precision of analyst
forecasts, analyst following, media attention on
meeting or beating analyst expectations and the
number of firms followed by analysts.
Given the strong incentives to meet analyst ex-
pectations, substantial research has focused on the
methods firms use to hit targets. The most popular
techniques examined are positive abnormal accru-
als and earnings guidance to walk down analyst
expectations to managers’ desired figure.
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence
of firms using working capital accruals to avoid
losses or earnings declines. They observe high
changes in working capital for earnings that fall
just above target, giving rise to a discontinuity in
their distribution. Payne and Robb (2000) find that
firms with pre-managed earnings below analyst
forecasts have greater positive abnormal accruals.
Dechow et al. (2000) find that firms that just meet
analyst forecasts have higher abnormal working
capital accruals than firms that just miss the target,
while Das and Zhang (2003) document that man-
agers use working capital accruals to round up re-
ported EPS to meet analyst forecasts. Abarbanell
and Lehavy (2003a) find that abnormal accruals
are the main source of both the tail and the middle
asymmetry in the distribution of forecast errors,
indicating the use of accruals to meet analyst ex-
pectations in the current period or to increase the
likelihood of hitting the target in the future.
Matsumoto (2002) documents a positive associa-
tion between income-increasing, abnormal accru-
als and the likelihood of avoiding negative
earnings surprises. This evidence on accruals man-
agement comes from US data predating the ac-
counting scandals of the early 2000s (e.g. Enron,
Worldcom) and the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002.
Based on a subsequent period, Graham et al.
(2005) report that chief financial officers of US
firms are generally reluctant to use discretionary
accounting adjustments to hit earnings targets. In
the post-scandals period, Koh et al. (2008) find
that the propensity of US managers to rely on in-
come-increasing, abnormal accruals to meet ana-
lyst expectations has decreased.
Bartov et al. (2002) provide preliminary evi-
dence on earnings forecast guidance. They observe
that even though analyst forecasts made at the be-
ginning of a period overestimate earnings on aver-
Vol. 39 No. 1. 2009 5
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age (giving a negative forecast error), as the end of
the period approaches, analyst optimism turns to
pessimism (giving a positive earnings surprise).
They also find that the proportion of negative fore-
cast errors ending with zero or positive earnings
surprises is greater than the proportion of positive
or zero forecast errors ending with negative earn-
ings surprises. Matsumoto (2002) extends these
findings by documenting a significant association
between a proxy for earnings forecast guidance
and the likelihood of beating expectations.
Similarly, Burgstahler and Eames (2006) find that
in addition to managing abnormal accruals, firms
manage analyst earnings forecasts downward to
just meet analyst expectations. In the post-scandals
period, Koh et al. (2008) document an increase in
the tendency of US firms to rely on earnings guid-
ance to meet analyst expectations.
Recent US studies examine a potentially new de-
vice to meet analyst expectations: classifications of
non-recurring items. While evidence suggests that
customised earnings (e.g. pro forma earnings or
Street earnings2) are more informative and more
persistent than GAAP earnings (Bradshaw and
Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2003), the finan-
cial press and accounting regulators in the US claim
that managers may be behaving opportunistically
by removing value-relevant items to hit earnings
benchmarks. Doyle et al. (2003) justify regulatory
scepticism with evidence that the items firms ex-
clude from Street earnings are negatively associat-
ed with firms’ future operating performance and
that the market does not reflect this information.
McVay (2006) adds to these findings with evidence
that US firms re-classify core expenses as negative
special items. She documents a positive association
between a measure of unexpected core earnings and
income-increasing, special items and finds that the
association is stronger for firms that would have
just missed the analyst forecast without the reclas-
sification. Lin et al. (2006) provide consistent evi-
dence when examining mechanisms that US firms
use to meet or beat analyst expectations. Their evi-
dence suggests that US firms use earnings forecast
guidance and classification shifting and to a limited
extent abnormal accruals to achieve analyst expec-
tations. On average they find that the use of earn-
ings forecast guidance, classification shifting and
income increasing, abnormal accruals increases the
probability of meeting or beating analyst expecta-
tions by 9%, 10% and 5% respectively.
2.2. UK evidence and regulatory framework
Evidence in the UK starts with the use of work-
ing capital accruals to achieve earnings targets.
Peasnell et al. (2000a) document that UK firms
with negative pre-managed earnings levels and
changes have positive mean AWCAs. This holds
for the period before the regulatory changes of the
early 1990s. The enforcement of FRS 3, subse-
quent standards issued by the Accounting
Standards Board (ASB) and the Cadbury Report
reflected a general shift by UK regulatory bodies
towards increased transparency and enhanced gov-
ernance to restrain managerial attempts to manip-
ulate earnings. Peasnell et al. (2000a) find that,
post-Cadbury, the increased level of governance
restrained the use of income-increasing AWCAs to
avoid losses or earnings declines. This evidence is
consistent with the regulatory shift and casts doubt
on whether UK firms still use income-increasing
AWCAs to achieve earnings targets in the post-
FRS 3 period. Gore et al. (2007) examine the dis-
tributional properties of reported and pre-managed
earnings and find that AWCAs are the main source
of discontinuity of earnings levels throughout the
period 1989–1998, but to a lesser extent post-FRS
3. However, examining the distributions of pre-
managed and reported earnings to document the
use of AWCAs to hit targets is sensitive to meas-
urement error in AWCA estimates and likely to
lead to erroneous inferences. Prior research has es-
tablished that most abnormal accrual models are
misspecified for firms that experience extreme op-
erating performance (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari
et al., 2005). This results in misclassifications of
normal accruals as abnormal in periods when firms
are highly profitable or unprofitable. In this case,
the result that pre-managed earnings do not display
a discontinuity around zero cannot be clearly at-
tributed to the use of abnormal accruals to exceed
the benchmark. The misclassification argument
becomes even more critical in view of the evi-
dence of Brown (2001) that the discontinuity of
earnings targets around zero is mainly a character-
istic of profitable firms. To address this method-
ological limitation, we re-examine the use of
AWCAs to achieve analyst expectations using a
research design that is less subject to measurement
error in AWCA estimates.
A further important element of the ASB’s inter-
vention in the financial reporting choices of UK
firms was FRS 3’s provisions for non-recurring
items and the option to disclose customised earn-
ings measures. FRS 3 required firms to distinguish
between operating and non-operating exception-
als. Non-operating exceptionals included profits or
losses on sales or termination of operations, fun-
damental reorganisation or restructuring costs and
profits or losses on the disposal of fixed assets.
6 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
2 Street earnings is the usual term for the adjusted earnings
figure that analyst tracking services such as I/B/E/S, Zacks
and First Call report as actual. Examples of charges that US
firms exclude from these adjusted earnings are restructuring
charges, write downs and impairments, R&D expenditures,
merger and acquisition costs, mandatory stock compensation
expense, goodwill amortisation, and certain results of sub-
sidiaries (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002).
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Firms had to disclose these items under separate
headings after operating profit, while they could
disclose exceptional items relating to operations
through a note or on the face of the income state-
ment. Further to enhancing their disclosure, FRS 3
widened the definition of exceptionals to include
any items of exceptional size or nature, thereby en-
abling firms to classify exceptional items accord-
ing to the nature of the firm’s operations. FRS 3
also redefined discontinued operations and re-
quired firms to disclose results from these opera-
tions separately in the income statement. Even
more important, FRS 3 allowed firms to disclose
alternative EPS on other profit levels, enabling
them to remove non-recurring items and highlight
a measure of core earnings. Pope and Walker
(1999) report evidence of firms using exceptional
items to classify bad news earnings components,
mainly in the form of write-offs of large transitory
losses. Consistent with this evidence, Walker and
Louvari (2003) argue that disclosures of alterna-
tive EPS post-FRS 3 reflected managerial percep-
tions of persistent earnings. Choi et al. (2005)
substantiate this argument with evidence that alter-
native EPS is more value-relevant than net income
in terms of earnings predictability and price–earn-
ings and return–earnings associations. Choi et al.
(2007) find that the items (both gains and losses)
managers exclude from alternative earnings defi-
nitions are value-irrelevant. Athanasakou et al.
(2007) report an increase in persistence of pre-ex-
ceptional earnings post-FRS 3, suggesting that
FRS 3 enhanced the role of classificatory choices
over exceptional items in identifying sustainable
profitability. While this evidence is inconsistent
with misclassifications of non-recurring items, the
broader scope for classificatory choices under FRS
3 may also have yielded a new mechanism for UK
firms to meet analyst expectations. Gore et al.
(2007) examine the distributions of positive and
negative extraordinary items by earnings surprise
portfolios pre-FRS 3 and find evidence consistent
with firms classifying core expenses as extraordi-
nary items to just meet analyst expectations.
However, they do not find similar evidence for ex-
ceptional items post-FRS 3. Possible reasons are
that the authors do not explore the association be-
tween exceptional items and pre-exceptional earn-
ings in the absence of earnings management, or the
properties of different types of exceptional items
post-FRS 3.
Brown and Higgins (2005) provide initial evi-
dence of earnings forecast guidance by UK firms.
The authors argue that in strong investor protec-
tion environments, characterised by common law
and market orientation, managers have greater in-
centives to avoid negative earnings surprises and
they are more likely to use earnings forecast guid-
ance than to manage reported earnings due to
tighter financial reporting regulation and less rig-
orous regulation of forecast guidance. Consistent
with their arguments, the authors find that the UK
and other strong investor protection countries (e.g.
the US, Sweden) have higher frequencies of firms
engaging in earnings forecast guidance (approxi-
mately 37%) than countries with weak investor
protection (e.g. Italy, Korea, Turkey).3 In line with
this initial evidence, the survey by Choi et al.
(2006) shows that investment professionals and fi-
nancial managers view earnings forecast guidance
as a prevalent practice in the UK.
Our study contributes to this literature by exam-
ining whether UK firms are indeed more likely to
use earnings forecasts guidance than earnings
management to meet analyst expectations. In addi-
tion to abnormal accruals, we study classification
shifting as a potential mechanism to hit the target
in view of the broader scope for classificatory
choices under FRS 3. Our study is similar to that
of Lin et al. (2006) insofar as we examine mecha-
nisms to meet analyst expectations. Nonetheless,
the distinctive characteristics of the UK financial
reporting framework allows us to conduct a more
thorough examination by considering the relevant
restraints (opportunities) that it imposes (creates)
on the use of mechanisms to meet analyst expecta-
tions. To this extent our examination is more intu-
itive and offers direct insights to accounting
standard setters, policy makers and market partici-
pants. These insights should be of special interest
to international regulators, as they currently seek
to optimise the framework for reporting financial
performance (IASB 2008). In addition to its broad-
er implications, our study uses a more sophisticat-
ed research design to test for accruals management
and classification shifting, allowing for more valid
inferences on the use of these practices to achieve
analyst expectations.
3. Research design
Our objective is to examine whether UK firms en-
gage in accruals management, classification shift-
ing or earnings forecast guidance to meet analyst
expectations. To examine earnings or expectations
management to meet analyst expectations, we test
the association between the probability of hitting
the target and an earnings or expectations manage-
ment proxy. To this end, we estimate abnormal ac-
cruals, misclassified non-recurring items and
downward-guided analyst forecasts. For non-re-
curring items it is impossible to estimate the part
Vol. 39 No. 1. 2009 7
3 La Porta et al. (1998) and Brown and Higgins (2005) show
that the UK has the highest investor protection ranking among
21 countries (including the US, Australia, Canada, France
Germany, Hong Kong, Greece, Spain Sweden and
Switzerland). The general shift by UK regulatory bodies to-
wards increased transparency and enhanced governance has
contributed to the enforced investor protection in the UK.
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resulting from intentional misclassifications be-
cause these items are unexpected and therefore un-
predictable. Accordingly, for classification shifting
we use a separate research design.
3.1. Abnormal accruals to meet analyst 
expectations
As the end of an accounting period nears, man-
agers can observe the firm’s underlying earnings as
well as the analyst forecast. During this time they
can estimate any shortfall from the consensus fore-
cast and use income-increasing AWCAs to elimi-
nate it. However, analyst forecasts change up to the
announcement of the results. From the financial
year-end to the announcement of the results, man-
agers cannot implement working capital accrual
choices involving timing of transactions (e.g. accel-
erating sales). Other accrual choices (deferrals, ac-
crued expenses, provisions, etc.) need estimating
and booking within the accounting system. The
process involves time constraints that reduce flexi-
bility in using accruals to meet forecasts. Kasznik
and McNichols (2002) show that the market pe-
nalises firms that previously met analyst expecta-
tions but subsequently fail to do so. This means
there is a cost to meeting expectations through pos-
itive abnormal accruals, as their reversal may pre-
vent managers from meeting expectations in future
accounting periods. The aggressive use of positive
abnormal accruals to meet analyst expectations is
also more likely to raise the suspicions of auditors
and the board of directors, who tend to scrutinise in-
come-increasing, discretionary, accounting choices.
To capture income-increasing earnings manage-
ment through working capital accruals, we use an
indicator of positive abnormal working capital ac-
cruals (POSAWCA). Appendix A defines all the
variables in the study. We focus on AWCAs in-
stead of abnormal total accruals as in Matsumoto
(2002) and Lin et al. (2006) for three reasons.
First, research shows that working capital accruals
account for most of the variation in total accruals
(Sloan, 1996; Subramanyam, 1996; Thomas and
Zhang, 2000; Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Second,
working capital accruals are more flexible than
non-current accruals (e.g. depreciation, amortisa-
tion, impairments) due to their frequent occurrence
and the higher degree of judgment involved in
their estimation. Third, non-current accruals usual-
ly represent large, visible, one-off costs or losses
(e.g. write-downs, provisions for restructuring
costs, impairments, losses on disposal of assets).
Managers are unlikely to use these items to meet
analyst expectations as analysts forecast core prof-
itability, i.e. earnings before exceptional and other-
non-recurring items.4
We estimate AWCAs using the cross-sectional
modified Jones model with lagged ROA as a con-
trol for operating performance as follows:5
(1)
where ΔCRit and AWCAi,t are change in revenue
net of change in accounts receivable and AWCAs
for firm i in period t, ROAit–1 and At–1 are return on
assets and total assets for firm i in period t–1, λ0
and λ1 are regression parameters and λ
^
0 and λ
^
1 are
OLS coefficients. We estimate equation (1) cross-
sectionally within industry–years to correct for
changing economic conditions that might affect
accruals independently of earnings management.
Peasnell et al. (2000b) show that the cross-section-
al modified Jones model captures relatively subtle
instances of accruals management in the UK. We
estimate the model for each industry–year with at
least six observations to ensure sufficient data for
parameter estimation. We use Datastream Level 6
industry classifications.
3.2. Earnings forecast guidance to meet analyst
expectations
If earnings fall short of analyst expectations,
firms can guide these expectations down to avoid
excessively optimistic forecasts and increase the
probability of meeting analyst expectations. UK in-
vestment professionals and financial managers
view earnings forecast guidance as a common prac-
tice (Choi et al., 2006). Similar to positive abnor-
mal accruals, earnings forecast guidance to meet
analyst expectations entails costs. If initial fore-
casts are excessively high, guiding forecasts down
requires analysts to revise their earnings expecta-
tions, which is likely to result in a negative market
reaction at the forecast revision date. Continuous
downward forecast guidance to keep forecasts at an
achievable level can result in a period of falling
prices. For earnings forecast guidance to be benefi-
cial, the cost of a negative earnings surprise must
exceed the cost of lower stock prices due to down-
ward forecast revisions. This is likely to be the case
8 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
4 Analysts forecast earnings on a continuing operations
basis, before discontinued operations and exceptional and non-
operating items, to retain persistent income components that
are important for security valuation (I/B/E/S Glossary 2000: 8).
5 As managerial discretion is not observable, measurement
error in abnormal accruals is inherent. Prior research that eval-
uates accrual models (Dechow et al., 1995; Healy, 1996;
Young, 1999; Thomas and Zhang, 2000) concludes that most
accrual models do not control adequately for operating per-
formance, exceptional and non-operating events, and growth.
To mitigate concern over the measurement error in the accru-
als model (equation 1) we add lagged ROA as a control for op-
erating performance and focus on working capital accruals
which are less likely to be affected by exceptional and non-op-
erating events, compared to non-current accruals. We also in-
clude a measure of growth in our multivariate specification
(see equation 5).
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as market reactions to earnings surprises tend to be
stronger than market reactions to forecast revisions
(Bartov et al., 2002: 189).
To obtain a proxy for earnings forecast guidance,
we follow Matsumoto (2002). Her methodology
allows us to disentangle innate analyst forecast re-
visions in response to bad earnings news from ex-
cessive downward revisions of the final analyst
forecast and to focus on the latter to capture firms
that guide analyst forecast down. We derive an in-
dicator of downward-guided forecasts (DOWN) by
comparing the last earnings forecast before the re-
lease of the earnings announcement (AF0) to an
estimate, based on stock returns, of what the fore-
cast would have been in the absence of guidance
(EF). We define the unexpected forecast (UEF) as
AF0 minus EF and set DOWN to 1 (0) when UEF
is negative (positive).
To estimate EF we use information that is avail-
able to analysts in forming their earnings expecta-
tions. We first model the change in I/B/E/S actual
EPS (ΔEPS) scaled by lagged share price (Pi,t–1) as
a function of the prior year’s change in earnings
scaled by lagged share price and cumulative ex-
cess returns over the current year (CRET)
ΔEPSi,t/Pi,t–1 = a1,t + a2,t (ΔEPSi,t–1/Pi,t–2) (2)
+ a3,tCRETi,t + ei,t
CRET is excess (market-adjusted) return cumulated
from the month following the year t-1 earnings an-
nouncement to the month of the year t earnings an-
nouncement. This variable captures additional
value-relevant information available to analysts in
estimating their forecasts. We estimate equation (2)
cross-sectionally within industry–years (using
OLS), similar to the method of estimating AWCAs.
Using cross sectional estimation with the time di-
mension fixed and scaling by lagged price means
that stationarity issues arising from the inclusion of
a lagged dependent variable in equation (2) is not a
cause for concern. To mitigate the effect of outliers
on parameter estimation, we winsorise the top and
bottom 0.5% of the variables.6 To calculate expect-
ed change in earnings, we use parameter estimates
of the prior year, so as to use only data that analysts
could have obtained when forecasting earnings
E(ΔEPSi,t) = [âi,t–1 + â2,t–1 (ΔEPSi,t–1/Pi,t–2) (3)
+ â3,t–1CRETi,t]  Pi,t–1
EF is lagged I/B/E/S actual EPS plus the expected
change in earnings E(ΔEPS)
EFi,t = EPSi,t–1 + E(ΔEPSi,t) (4)
After obtaining EF, we derive DOWN as follows
UEFi,t = AF0i,t – EFi,t
3.3. Methodology and empirical predictions
To examine whether the proxies for accruals man-
agement and earnings guidance capture the mecha-
nisms UK firms use to meet analyst expectations we
examine the relation between (a) the probability of
meeting analyst forecasts; and (b) the indicators of
positive AWCAs (POSAWCA) and of downward-
guided analyst forecasts (DOWN), using contin-
gency tables and multivariate models that control
for other factors associated with meeting analyst ex-
pectations. We estimate the following logit regres-
sion of the probability that a firm meets or beats
analyst forecasts at the earnings announcement date
(5)
where
MBE equals 1 if the earnings surprise is zero or
positive, and 0 otherwise. The earnings surprise is
actual EPS minus the latest analyst forecast made
prior to the earnings announcement date, both
from I/B/E/S. As prior UK evidence casts doubt on
whether UK firms used AWCAs to meet analyst
expectations post-FRS 3, the sign of the coeffi-
cient on POSAWCA is an empirical question. If
UK firms guide analyst forecasts down to meet an-
alyst expectations, consistent with the survey evi-
dence of Choi et al. (2006), we expect the
coefficient on DOWN to be positive.
In addition to meeting analyst expectations, the
prior literature establishes two other earnings 
targets: profits and positive earnings changes.
Degeorge et al. (1999) were the first to address the
hierarchy of earnings targets. Based on conditional
distributions of the three earnings benchmarks, they
infer a ‘pecking order’, with profit first, prior year
earnings second and analyst forecasts third. As they
find no evidence of a discontinuity around zero in
the distributions of forecast errors for firms report-
ing losses and earnings decreases, they conclude
that meeting analyst expectations matters only if
both other targets are met. Similarly, Brown (2001)
finds that profitable firms make the most effort to
meet analyst expectations and that the discontinuity
around the earnings benchmark is not evident in
loss-making firms. Even though Brown and Caylor
(2005) suggest that since the mid-1990s managers
Vol. 39 No. 1. 2009 9
6 We set the bottom 0.5% of the values of the variables equal
to the value corresponding to the 0.5th percentile, and the top
0.5% of the values to the value corresponding to the 99.5th
percentile.
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10 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
have sought to avoid negative earnings surprises
more than losses and earnings declines, Dopuch et
al. (2003) find that there is an incremental market
credibility premium for firms that meet analyst ex-
pectations in addition to meeting a time series
benchmark. Their evidence suggests that firms have
stronger incentives to meet analyst forecasts once
they meet prior year earnings. In their survey,
Graham et al. (2005) provide evidence consistent
with the priority of meeting prior-year earnings over
analyst expectations. As evidence on the priority of
earnings targets is controversial and focuses on US
firms, the association between the three earnings
targets in the UK remains an empirical question. If
there is a pecking order in meeting earnings targets
and analyst forecasts is last in the order, we need to
control for the targets of profits and earnings in-
creases. Accordingly, we add a profit indicator,
PROFIT, and an indicator of positive change in
earnings, POSΔEARN. We expect the coefficients
on PROFIT and POSΔEARN to be positive.
Matsumoto (2002) argues that the underlying
reason for Brown’s (2001) findings is the low
value-relevance of the earnings of loss-making
firms and not merely the sign of contemporaneous
earnings. She argues that managers of firms with
low value-relevance of earnings are less likely to
be concerned about hitting analyst forecasts since
investors put less emphasis on a poor indicator of
performance. Accordingly, we add a proxy for the
value-relevance of earnings (VREARN) and pre-
dict that firms with low value-relevance of earn-
ings are less likely to meet analyst expectations.
Therefore, we expect the coefficient on VREARN
to be positive.
Skinner and Sloan (2002) find that the disconti-
nuity in the distribution of earnings surprises
around zero is stronger for higher-growth firms.
Managers of such firms have stronger incentives to
avoid negative earnings surprises because the mar-
ket reaction to earnings announcements is more se-
vere for these firms. Moreover, Dechow et al.
(2000), show that firms with zero earnings surpris-
es have, along with high market-to-book ratios,
high levels of accruals. Therefore we control for
GROWTH and expect firms with higher growth
opportunities to have greater incentives to meet
analyst expectations. Similar to Skinner and Sloan
(2002), we measure growth using the market-to-
book ratio. We expect the coefficient on GROWTH
to be positive.
Firms with a higher risk of shareholder litigation
have greater incentives to meet analyst expecta-
tions and reduce the possibility of shareholder law-
suits. To control for this effect Matsumoto (2002)
includes an industry dummy (LIT) identifying
firms in the high risk industries of biotechnology,
computers, electronics and retailing. She argues
that the industry indicator offers a better measure of
ex-ante litigation risk, as it is unaffected by earn-
ings management. Although we do not expect
shareholder litigation risk to be as important for
UK firms, we add LIT to control for any possible
effect. To the extent firms in the high risk industries
of biotechnology, computers, electronics and retail-
ing have greater incentives to meet analyst expec-
tations, we expect the coefficient on LIT to be
positive.
We control for contemporaneous shocks to
earnings since they are strongly related to analyst
forecast errors. A firm’s performance for the peri-
od, as well as general macroeconomic shocks, 
affect the probability of meeting analyst expecta-
tions. Positive earnings shocks are more likely to
result in positive forecast errors than are negative
earnings shocks. We control for this effect
through POSΔEARN. To control for the impact of
macroeconomic conditions on forecast errors, we
include average annual growth in industrial pro-
duction (INDPROD). Similar to Matsumoto
(2002), we expect the frequency of meeting ana-
lyst expectations to increase with growth in in-
dustrial production, thus we expect the
coefficient on INDPROD to be positive.
Furthermore, as larger firms are more subject to
public scrutiny their managers have stronger in-
centives to meet analyst expectations. Therefore
we control for size and expect the coefficient on
SIZE to be positive. Finally, Kasznik and
McNichols (2002) find that firms that meet ana-
lyst expectations in consecutive years receive a
market premium that is incremental to the higher
future earnings that investors can rationally ex-
pect from these firms. This signifies the existence
of a ‘credibility’ reward for consistently meeting
expectations, giving greater incentives to meet
analyst expectations in the current year if the firm
met expectations in the previous year. We add
MBEt–1 to control for this effect and expect its co-
efficient to be positive.7
Doyle et al. (2004) argue that removing observa-
tions with large forecast errors and focusing
around the zero earnings surprise benchmark gives
a more powerful test of earnings or expectations
management to hit the forecast. Therefore, we re-
peat equation (5) using JMBE instead of MBE,
which captures cases where firms just meet analyst
forecasts over cases where firms just miss the tar-
get, as follows:
(6)
7 We also test a specification adding MBEt–2 and MBEt–3 (see
footnote 15).
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JMBE equals 1 if the earnings surprise (SURP) is
in the interval £0.00 ≤ SURP < £0.02 and 0 if the
earnings surprise is in the interval –£0.02 ≤ SURP
< 0.8 Using this specification we delete observa-
tions outside the interval –£0.02 ≤ SURP < £0.02.9
3.4. Classification shifting to meet analyst 
expectations
The provisions of FRS 3 broadened the scope for
classificatory choices over non-recurring items. As
both managers and analysts tend to exclude non-
recurring items from core earnings, classification
shifting of core expenses or losses to non-recurring
items after the end of the accounting period and
before the announcement of the results could in-
crease the probability of hitting the final forecast.
Unlike discretionary accounting choices, classifi-
cation shifting does not flow through the account-
ing system, giving managers a more valuable
timing option to meet the final forecast. In addi-
tion, classification shifting does not affect net in-
come, thus limiting the scrutiny of auditors,
outside monitors and regulators (Nelson et al.,
2003; McVay, 2006).10 Finally, classification shift-
ing does not affect future period income, reducing
substantially its cost as an earnings management
device.
FRS 3’s transparency requirements imposed an
important cost of classification shifting on UK
firms. FRS 3 required firms that reported alterna-
tive EPS to reconcile this to the basic figure, to dis-
close it consistently over time, to give it no greater
prominence in the annual report than basic EPS and
to explain the reasons for any alternative measure
and its significance, adjacent to alternative EPS or
through a note. Furthermore, for each exceptional
item in the income statement, firms had to provide
an adequate description to allow users to under-
stand its nature. Transparency requirements add a
constraint to attempts to shift core expenses below
core earnings, as they increase the likelihood that
investors detect misclassified non-recurring items.
Although McVay (2006) does not explore potential
changes in the practice of classification shifting by
US firms after the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, re-
cent evidence suggests that the disclosure require-
ments of the Act had a significant impact on US
managers’ attempts to misclassify income compo-
nents (Heflin and Hsu, 2008).
Even though transparency requirements restrain
classification shifting, investors may be unable to
distinguish cases of misclassified non-recurring
items. This is especially true of operating excep-
tional items, as it is more difficult to determine
their degree of persistence. In addition, while au-
ditors may question classification manipulations
involving more visible and specific non-operating
exceptionals, they are less likely to challenge clas-
sifications of operating exceptionals. This is be-
cause the latter classifications rely more on mana-
gerial judgment and less on explicit definitions and
disclosure requirements.
To examine whether UK firms reclassified core
expenses as non-recurring items to meet analyst
expectations in the post-FRS 3 period, we test the
association between unexpected core earnings
(levels and changes) and income-increasing, non-
recurring items. Following McVay (2006), we de-
rive measures of expected core earnings (CE)
levels and changes (ΔCE) as follows:
CEi,t = γ0 + γ1CEi,t–1 + γ2ATOi,t + γ3WCAi,t–1 (7)
+ γ4WCAi,t + γ5ΔSALESi,t
+ γ6NEG_ΔSALESi,t + ui,t
ΔCEi,t = γ0 + γ1CEi,t–1 + γ2ΔCEi,t–1 + γ3ΔATOi,t (8)
+ γ3WCAi,t–1 + γ4WCAi,t + γ5ΔSALESi,t
+ γ6NEG_ΔSALESi,t + ui,t
As a proxy for core earnings (CE) we use I/B/E/S
actual EPS11 multiplied by the weighted average
Vol. 39 No. 1. 2009 11
8 To ensure equally sized intervals, we include –£0.02 in the
interval of firms that just miss analyst expectations, but ex-
clude £0.02 from the interval of firms that just meet or beat an-
alyst expectations.
9 Our core results remain when using a narrower JMBE in-
terval –£0.01 ≤ SURP < £0.01.
10 Auditors and outside monitors are more concerned with
issues of unrecognised expenses, or abnormal variations in
margins and other ratios, and are less likely to question the ap-
propriate classification of expenses. Also firms reporting ex-
traordinary and exceptional items tend to be declining in
performance, so even though their core earnings might be
higher than actual core earnings, their reported earnings may
still be below prior-period and industry benchmarks.
11 We choose I/B/E/S actual EPS as a proxy for core earnings
for three reasons. First, compared to alternative EPS disclosed
in the income statement, using I/B/E/S actual EPS allows us to
expand the sample and run more powerful tests using a large
panel of data instead of a small hand-collected sample. Second,
I/B/E/S actual EPS is closer to analysts’ definitions of earnings,
which is important when calculating earnings surprises and our
measure of (J)MBE. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) argue that to the
extent there is a mismatch between the actual earnings and the
forecast figure, there can be a severe error-in-variables problem
in the earnings surprise measure. Third, compared with alter-
native adjusted earnings metrics available in Datastream, we ex-
pect I/B/E/S actual EPS to be a more accurate proxy of the
firm’s core earnings. This is because analyst tracking services
adjust realised earnings by making exclusions for non-recur-
ring items on what Gu and Chen (2004) refer to as a ‘case by
case’ basis instead of the category by category basis that
Datastream follows. This means that the tracking services treat
transitory items selectively according to firm-specific charac-
teristics, with the result that their exclusions are closer to those
of managers. To assess the relation between alternative EPS,
I/B/E/S actual EPS, and Datastream adjusted EPS we use data
on alternative EPS disclosures for 1996 and 2001 for the 500
largest UK listed non-financial firms. We are grateful to Dr.
Young-Soo Choi, Lancaster University, for providing this data.
Descriptive analysis of this sample indicates that alternative
EPS is most highly correlated with I/B/E/S actual EPS and that
the mean and median differences between the two figures are
not statistically significant.
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number of shares (both unadjusted for splits)12 and
scaled by total sales. Lagged core earnings controls
for earnings persistence over time. Given the close
association between core earnings and profit mar-
gin, the asset turnover ratio (ATO) controls for the
inverse relation with the profit margin, especially
for firms with large income-increasing, non-recur-
ring items (e.g. restructuring or reorganisation
costs). Lagged working capital accruals (WCAt–1)
capture the information content of prior-year accru-
als for current-period income. Current working
capital accruals (WCAt) controls for extreme oper-
ating performance, as it is highly correlated with
accrual levels. As excessive accruals could also re-
flect accruals management, controlling for WCAt is
necessary to capture any excess profits associated
solely with classification shifting. Finally, change
in sales (ΔSALES) controls for the effect of sales
growth on fixed costs. As this effect differs between
sales increases and decreases, we allow a separate
coefficient for sales declines (NEG_ΔSALES). The
model of change in CE (equation 8) is not obtained
by merely differencing equation (7). Including both
lagged CE and lagged ΔCE allows the degree of
mean reversion to vary with the level of prior-year
earnings.
We estimate equations (7) and (8) cross-section-
ally within industry–years (using OLS). Unexpected
core earnings (UCE) and unexpected change in
core earnings (UΔCE) are the differences between
reported core earnings and change in core earnings
and their predicted values, which we derive based
on the coefficients of equations (7) and (8). To ex-
amine whether classification shifting represents an
earnings management tool to meet analyst expec-
tations, we test the association between UCE and
UΔCE and income-increasing, non-recurring items
for the entire sample and subsets of firms that are
increasingly likely to use classification shifting to
hit the target. In particular, similar to McVay
(2006) we estimate the following two OLS regres-
sions:
UCEi,t = δ0 + δ1TNRIi,t + ui,t (9)
UΔCEi,t+1 = δ0 + δ1TNRIi,t + ui,t (10)
where TNRI is income-increasing, total non-recur-
ring items defined as:
TNRI = I/B/E/S actual earnings –
Net Income/Sales
and I/B/E/S actual earnings is the I/B/E/S reported
actual EPS multiplied by the weighted average
number of shares (both unadjusted for splits). Net
income is earnings after extraordinary items. If
I/B/E/S actual earnings is greater than net income,
then total non-recurring items are income-increas-
ing (through the exclusion of negative items). We
estimate equations (9) and (10) for the entire sam-
ple and two subsets of firms: (a) firms with income
increasing total non-recurring items (TNRI > 0);
and (b) firms that would have just missed the ana-
lyst forecast had they not re-classified non-recur-
ring items (JUSTMET = 1). JUSTMET equals 1 if
the earnings surprise is from £0.00 to £0.02 per
share, total non-recurring items are income-in-
creasing and the earnings surprise minus total non-
recurring items per share is negative, 0 otherwise.
To the extent UK firms classification shift, unex-
pected core earnings increase with non-recurring
items in year t, giving a positive δ1. If classifica-
tion shifting serves as a mechanism to meet analyst
expectations, the positive association between
TNRI and UCE will be more profound for the two
subsets of firms. While a positive association be-
tween TNRI and UCE is consistent with classifica-
tion shifting, it is also consistent with efficiency
gains resulting from disposals of unprofitable sub-
sidiaries or from rationalising operations. To dis-
tinguish between these two competing hypotheses,
we test whether the increase in UCE reverses in
year t+1, as the core expenses firms misclassify in
year t recur in year t+1, similar to McVay (2006).
A positive δ1 in equation (9) and a negative δ1 in
equation (10) are more consistent with classifica-
tion shifting.
Choi et al. (2005) classify total non-recurring
items that UK firms tend to exclude from core
earnings into five groups: (a) non-operating excep-
tional items; (b) operating exceptional items; (c)
other non-operating exceptional items; (d) charges
relating to asset values; and (e) other non-recurring
items. Non-operating exceptionals are usually large
transitory items resulting from structural events.
Their specific nature allows investors to assess
their persistence with greater confidence.
Moreover, the incidence and value of the finite
number of events giving rise to such exceptionals
constrain the extent to which managers can use
them for classification shifting (Godfrey and Jones,
1999). The remaining items include: specified or
unspecified exceptional operating costs; exception-
al dividends, interest or taxation; other provisions;
goodwill amortisation; amortisation of unspecified
intangible assets; impairment diminution or write-
off of goodwill; revaluation or impairment of fixed
assets and discontinued operations; and acquisi-
tion, merger and demerger costs. These items offer
greater latitude for classification shifting as their
classification relies heavily on managerial judg-
ment. To accommodate the different degree of clas-
12 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
12 All data in the I/B/E/S detail file that are most commonly
used in prior research appear on a split-adjusted basis to en-
sure that per share amounts are comparable over time. To cal-
culate non-recurring items we need the historical figures for
I/B/E/S actual EPS. Accordingly we ‘unsplit’ I/B/E/S actual
EPS using the proper adjustment factors to derive the origi-
nally reported amounts.
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sification discretion involved in the groups of non-
recurring items, we extend the two equations of
McVay (2006) by decomposing total non-recurring
items (TNRI) into non-operating exceptional items
(NOEI) (group (a)) and other non-recurring items
(ONRI) (groups (b)–(e)) as follows
UCEi,t = δ0 + δ1aNOEIi,t + δ1bONRIi,t + ui,t (11)
UΔCEi,t+1 = δ0 + δ1aNOEIi,t + δ1bONRIi,t + ui,t (12)
NOEI is non-operating exceptional items, i.e.
profits or losses on the sale or termination of oper-
ations, costs of fundamental reorganisations or re-
structuring and profits or losses on the sale of fixed
assets, adjusted for tax and minority interest and
scaled by sales. We derive ONRI as the residual
non-recurring items after deducting NOEI from
TNRI. As other non-recurring items offer a more
flexible device for classification shifting to meet
analyst expectations we expect δ1b to be positive.
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2002) find that when
core earnings slightly exceed analyst forecasts
while GAAP earnings fall slightly below, core
earnings are more value-relevant than GAAP earn-
ings. Therefore, they suggest that future research
should isolate cases where classifications of small
income-increasing non-recurring items lead to
small positive earnings surprises. The magnitude
of non-recurring items is an interesting property
when considering classification shifting to meet
analyst expectations. Large non-recurring items
are highly visible and depend on the occurrence of
specific (e.g. structural) events. Conversely, small
non-recurring items are less debatable and offer a
more flexible means of classification shifting, es-
pecially in cases where pre-managed earnings fall
slightly short of the final analyst forecast. To in-
corporate this feature into our analysis, we repeat
equations (9)–(12) on subsets of firms that just
meet analyst expectations using small income-in-
creasing, non-recurring items. We distinguish
small non-recurring items similar to Doyle et al.
(2004). SmallTNRI equals 1 if TNRI is positive and
less than median TNRI (scaled by sales) for firms
with positive TNRI in the same year.
As we use panel data, we need to control for
cross-sectional dependence. To alleviate bias in the
standard errors of equations (9)–(12) due to het-
eroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependence,
we estimate standard errors clustered by year.
4. Sample selection
We collect data for all UK (dead and live) listed
firms from Datastream for the period 1994 to 2002.
We begin with 1994 because we focus on the peri-
od following the enforcement of FRS 3 (23 June
1993) and coverage of UK firms on I/B/E/S is lim-
ited for earlier years. Our sample period cut-off is
2002 due to data unavailability for non-operating
exceptional items and other non-recurring items
after the merger of Datastream with Worldscope in
2003.13 We exclude financial firms because of their
substantially different financial reporting environ-
ment and utilities because they are regulated and
their earnings growth is typically more predictable.
We also eliminate all accounting periods where
there is a change in year-end, to ensure forecasts
throughout the year refer to a 12-month accounting
period. In line with Bartov et al. (2002), we keep
observations with at least three individual earnings
forecasts for the year to ensure there is an initial
forecast, a reliable revision and a final forecast. The
resulting sample with full data coverage in I/B/E/S
is 1,397 firms and 6,199 observations. From this
sample, consistent with McVay (2006), we delete
observations with sales of less than £0.6m to avoid
extreme outlying values of levels and changes in
core earnings as sales are used as their deflator. Of
the remaining observations (1,388 firms and 6,158
observations), we keep those where we can esti-
mate unexpected core earnings. The final sample
comprises 1,154 firms and 5,117 observations for
tests of MBE and 1,033 firms and 3,609 observa-
tions for tests of JMBE. Tests of future unexpected
changes in core earnings require one-year-ahead
earnings, reducing the sample to 941 firms and
3,968 observations. To mitigate the effect of out-
liers in the data, we winsorise all variables at the
0.5% and 99.5% percentiles.
The first two columns of Table 1, Panel A report
the annual distribution of observations for tests of
MBE. The number of firms in each period repre-
sent on average 77% of all UK non-financial firms
covered by I/B/E/S with data available for analyst
forecasts and actual earnings (not tabulated). The
third column of Table 1, Panel A reports the annu-
al distribution of observations for tests of JMBE.
The fraction of earnings surprises within the inter-
val for measuring JMBE (–£0.02 ≤ SURP < £0.02),
is approximately 71% of the sample (3,609 out of
5,117) indicating a high concentration of UK
firm–year observations around the earnings sur-
prise benchmark.
Vol. 39 No. 1. 2009 13
13 As Datastream recently retrieved data for accounting items
up to 2005 (Datastream archive) we assessed the scope for ex-
tending our sample period post-2002. After inspecting the
archive we concluded that the data was not reliable due to lim-
ited firm coverage and minor discrepancies with the old
Datastream data for key variables in our study. Since these data
limitations give rise to survivorship bias and errors in variables
issues in the extended sample, we maintain the reported results
on the original sample (1994–2002). As a robustness check we
repeated our core tests on a sample extended to 2005 (pre-
IFRS) using data from the archive. We obtain qualitatively sim-
ilar results. The only exception pertains to tests of classification
shifting for subsets of firms that are more likely to have en-
gaged in this practice. As tests of classification shifting on a
narrow subset of firms are especially prone to survivorship bias
this result is not appropriate for valid inferences.
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5. Results
5.1. Descriptive analysis
Columns 4–7 of Table 1, Panel A report the fre-
quency of meeting analyst forecasts (MBE) and
just meeting analyst forecasts (JMBE) across
years. While Matsumoto (2002) documents a mo-
notonic increase in MBE from 1990 to 1997, in the
UK MBE does not change systematically from
1994 to 1997, but there is a steady decrease start-
ing in 1998, becoming sharper in 2000 and 2001.
Over the same period JMBE also falls. To explore
the fall in MBE, the next two columns of Table 1,
Panel A report the frequency of negative forecast
errors and the mean and median forecast error,
while Panel B reports the annual real growth in the
UK GDP, industrial production and the index of
total services. The frequency of negative forecast
errors rises sharply in 2001, reaching 75.55%.
Mean and median forecast errors are increasingly
negative in 2000 and 2001. The UK economy ap-
pears to have experienced a mild recession during
2001–2002. Weak macroeconomic conditions are
reflected in the falling rate of real growth in the
UK GDP (from 0.038 in 2000 to 0.024 in 2001 and
0.021 in 2002) and the index of total services
(from in 0.039 in 2000 to 0.021 in 2001 and 0.014
in 2002) and the fall in industrial production
(–0.047 in 2001 and –0.002 in 2002). Overall, the
fall in MBE overlaps a period of macroeconomic
decline and a rise in the magnitude and frequency
of negative forecast errors.
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics
for key variables. Mean MBE and JMBE for the
entire panel are 60% and 65%. While the average
use of positive AWCAs is 49%, 53% of forecasts
are guided down.14 Mean (median) core earnings
as a percentage of sales are 1.9% (5%). Mean non-
recurring items are 2.1% of total sales: 4.6% when
they are income-increasing and –0.9% when they
are income-decreasing (from untabulated analy-
sis). A small part of non-recurring items, 0.3% of
total sales on average, comprises non-operating
exceptional items (NOEI), while the major part,
1.8% of total sales, is other non-recurring items
(ONRI) (e.g. operating exceptionals and other non-
operating and value-irrelevant items). Annual
analysis (untabulated) shows a gradual rise in
TNRI from 0.9% of sales in 1994 to 5.6% in 2002,
due mainly to the growing magnitude of ONRI.
Panel B of Table 2 reports Pearson (Spearman)
correlations between the key variables. While the
frequency of achieving analyst expectations is
positively correlated with the frequency of fore-
casts guided down (0.080, 0.080) and unexpected
core earnings (0.088, 0.144), it is not significantly
associated with reporting of positive AWCAs.
Reporting of positive AWCAs is negatively asso-
ciated with unexpected core earnings (–0.034) and
income-increasing other non-recurring items
(–0.032, –0.026). The frequency of forecasts guid-
ed down is also negatively correlated with unex-
pected core profits (–0.048, –0.105). This evidence
is consistent with managers using earnings and 
expectations management mechanisms as substi-
tutes. Finally, income-increasing other non-recur-
ring items are positively correlated with
unexpected core profits (0.033, 0.029) and nega-
tively correlated with future changes in unexpect-
ed core earnings (–0.042). These results suggest
that firms with guided forecasts and unexpected
core profits arising from classifications of other
non-recurring items are more likely to achieve an-
alyst expectations.
5.2. Results on accruals management vs. forecast
guidance to meet analyst expectations
5.2.1. Contingency tables
Figure 1 shows the distribution of earnings sur-
prises. We aggregate earnings surprises observa-
tions into equally sized intervals (bins). We set the
size of each bin to 0.5p. As we concentrate on
earnings management attempts to hit the zero earn-
ings surprise benchmark, we aggregate all earn-
ings surprises below –10p to the 20th bin below
zero and all earnings surprises above 10p to the
20th bin above zero. Consistent with Gore et al.
(2007: 132) we document a discontinuity at zero
caused by the higher frequency of small positive
compared with small negative surprises. This is
consistent with either earnings management or
forecast guidance to meet analyst expectations.
Table 3, Panel A presents contingency tables ex-
amining the relation between MBE and indicators
of positive AWCAs (POSAWCA) and of down-
ward-guided analyst forecasts (DOWN). The re-
sults show no significant difference in MBE
between firms with income-increasing (59.27%)
versus income-decreasing or zero AWCAs
(61.31%). In contrast, of firm–years where analyst
forecasts are guided down (DOWN = 1) 64% meet
analyst expectations, compared with firm–years
with no downward guidance (DOWN = 0) when
56% meet the forecast. A chi-square test shows
that the difference between the two groups is high-
ly significant (χ2 = 32.78, p ≤ 0.001). Inferences
remain the same in moving to JMBE in Panel B.
These initial findings suggest that UK firms are
more likely to guide analyst forecasts down to
Vol. 39 No. 1. 2009 15
14 Estimating downward-guided forecasts (DOWN) requires
two years of lagged data (see equations 2 and 3). As we can-
not use pre-FRS 3 observations, to avoid the effect of sample
attrition on tests of forecast guidance we replace missing val-
ues of DOWN by an indicator of negative forecast revisions.
This induces measurement error to our proxy to the extent that
forecast guidance does not result in negative forecast revi-
sions. In Appendix B we repeat our tests on a restricted sam-
ple using the initial estimate of DOWN. This leaves the core
results unaltered.
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Figure 1
Frequency distribution of earnings surprises
The sample consists of 5,117 observations during the period 1994–2002 for 1,154 UK firms meeting the sam-
ple selection criteria. The earnings surprise is the difference between I/B/E/S actual EPS and the latest analyst
forecast made prior to the earnings announcement date. We aggregate earnings surprises observations into
equally sized intervals (bins). The size of each bin is 0.5p. All earnings surprises below –10p are aggregated to
the 20th bin below zero and all earnings surprises above 10p are aggregated to the 20th bin above zero.
meet analyst expectations rather than use income-
increasing AWCAs.
5.2.2. Multivariate analysis
Model 1 in Table 4 presents results from logistic
regressions of MBE on indicators of positive
AWCAs (POSAWCA) and of downward-guided
analyst forecasts (DOWN), and a series of incen-
tives and controls (equation 5). The Table also re-
ports the marginal effects (economic significance)
of the explanatory variables. POSAWCA is nega-
tive and significant (–0.187, z = –2.99). POSAWCA
is also negative and significant (–0.188, z = –3.05)
when excluding DOWN from the equation. Given
the inclusion of PROFIT and POSΔEARN in this
specification, this result suggests that, controlling
for the targets of positive earnings levels and
changes, firms with income-increasing AWCAs
have a lower probability of meeting analyst expec-
tations of about 4%. In a specification excluding
PROFIT and POSΔEARN, the association between
POSAWCA and MBE is insignificant. On the other
hand, the coefficient on DOWN is positive and
highly significant (0.744, z = 11.07), consistent
with downward-guided forecasts increasing the
probability of meeting analyst expectations by ap-
proximately 18%. DOWN remains positive and
significant when excluding POSAWCA from the
equation (0.743, z = 11.09) and in a specification
excluding PROFIT and POSΔEARN (0.297, z =
5.03). With the exception of LIT and SIZE all other
variables are significant and in accordance with
the predicted signs.15 Repeating the tests using
price volatility (market β) to proxy for risk 
of shareholder litigation gives an insignificant co-
efficient on LIT. These results are consistent with
the less litigious UK business environment. In a
specification excluding PROFIT and POSΔEARN,
SIZE is positive and significant, consistent with
15 In a specification that includes MBEt–2 and MBEt–3 (735
firms, 2,544 observations), while the coefficient on MBEt–1 re-
mains positive and significant, the coefficients on additional
lags are insignificant. This finding suggests that only last peri-
od performance (i.e. achieving analyst expectations in the pre-
vious year) affects a firm’s ability to meet analyst expectations
in the current period.
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larger firms having stronger incentives to meet an-
alyst expectations.16
In Model 2 of Table 4 we repeat the analysis
using JMBE instead of MBE (equation 6). 
POSAWCA is now marginally significant (–0.132,
z = –1.81), while DOWN remains positive and sig-
nificant at 1% (0.492, z = 6.22). Taken together,
the results in Table 4 suggest that unlike income-
increasing AWCAs, earnings forecast guidance is
a common mechanism that UK firms use to avoid
negative earnings surprises.
As an additional test of earnings forecast guid-
ance, we follow Bartov et al. (2002) and test the
effect of forecast revisions on the sign of earnings
surprises. Bartov et al. (2002) argue that in the ab-
sence of a forecast revision, the earnings surprise
and the quarterly forecast error have the same sign.
Accordingly, a negative forecast error that, due to
Vol. 39 No. 1. 2009 19
Table 3
The association between the probability of meeting expectations (MBE) and of just meeting expectations
(JMBE) with earnings management and forecast guidance.
Panel A: Contingency tables classifying observations based on: (1) an indicator of meeting analyst
forecasts (MBE); and (2) indicators of positive abnormal working capital accruals (POSAWCA) and 
of downward-guided analyst forecasts (DOWN).
POSAWCA = 0 POSAWCA = 1 DOWN = 0 DOWN = 1
MBE = 0 1,009 1,022 1,047 984
(38.69%) (40.73%) (43.88%) (36.03%)
MBE = 1 1,599 1,487 1,339 1,747
(61.31%) (59.27%) (56.12%) (63.97%)
Total 2,608 2,509 2,386 2,731
χ2 = 2.23 χ2 = 32.78
p = 0.135 p = ≤ 0.001
Panel B: Contingency tables classifying observations based on: (1) an indicator of just meeting analyst
forecasts (JMBE); and (2) indicators of positive abnormal working capital accruals (POSAWCA) and
of downward-guided analyst forecasts (DOWN).
POSAWCA = 0 POSAWCA = 1 DOWN = 0 DOWN = 1
JMBE = 0 622 641 639 624
(34.16%) (35.85%) (37.52%) (32.74%)
JMBE = 1 1,199 1,147 1,064 1,282
(65.84%) (64.15%) (62.48%) (67.26%)
Total 1,821 1,788 1,703 1,906
χ2 = 1.15 χ2 = 9.05 
p = 0.286 p = 0.003
The sample consists of 5,117 observations during the period 1994–2002 for 1,154 UK firms that meet the sam-
ple selection criteria. Appendix A defines the variables. All observations outside the interval –£0.02 ≤ SURP
< £0.02 are deleted when JMBE is used, resulting in 1,033 firms and 3,609 observations. SURP is the earnings
surprise measured as the difference between I/B/E/S actual EPS and the latest analyst forecast made prior to
the earnings announcement date.
16 In addition to litigation risk, value-relevance of earnings and the firm’s growth prospects, Matsumoto (2002) examines in-
stitutional ownership as a managerial incentive to avoid negative earnings surprises. To the extent institutional investors focus
on short-term earnings, and especially on earnings surprises, as they represent a basic metric on which to base trades, managers
of firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to take actions to meet analyst expectations. In line with her predic-
tion, Matsumoto finds that high percentages of institutional ownership increase the probability of meeting or beating analyst ex-
pectations. As data on institutional ownership of UK firms are not available for our entire sample, we repeated our core tests
adding a control for the percentage of shares held by institutions on a subset of 375 firms (635 observations) that had available
ownership structure data and met our sample selection criteria. We are grateful to Dr. Steven Young, Lancaster University, for
providing the ownership structure data. On this subset, consistent with Matsumoto (2002), the association between institutional
ownership and MBE is positive, but only marginally significant (0.747, z = 1.75). Future research could assess whether this weak
evidence of an institutional impact is due to the effect of different types of institutional holdings in UK firms. While POSAWCA
is not significant, DOWN remains positive and significant (1.056, z = 5.12).
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20 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 4
Logit analysis of the probability of meeting analyst forecasts as a function of indicators of positive 
abnormal working capital accruals (POSAWCA) and of downward-guided analyst forecasts (DOWN)
and a series of other incentives and controls.
(5)
(6)
where
MBE JMBE
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal 
(z-stat) effect (z-stat) effect
Intercept –1.829*** –1.336
(–2.08) (–1.58)
POSAWCA ? –0.187*** –0.044 –0.132* –0.030
(–2.99) (–1.81)
DOWN + 0.744*** 0.176 0.492*** 0.111
(11.07) (6.22)
PROFIT + 1.293*** 0.312 0.432** 0.102
(9.84) (2.29)
POSΔEARN + 1.253*** 0.296 0.887*** 0.205
(17.94) (10.67)
VREARN + 0.035** 0.008 0.022 0.005
(2.41) (1.32)
GROWTH + 0.019** 0.004 0.020* 0.004
(2.27) (1.97)
LIT + –0.110 –0.026 0.129 0.029
(–0.20) (0.21)
INDPROD + 7.339*** 1.740 5.620*** 1.262
(5.61) (3.60)
SIZE + 0.013 0.003 0.033** 0.007
(1.08) (2.35)
MBEt-1 + 0.320*** 0.076 0.288*** 0.065
(4.98) (3.79)
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Log likelihood –3,039.14 –2,216.47
Chi-square 643.84 220.84
p-value <0.001 <0.001
Correctly classified 68.88% 66.99%
No. of observations:
Meet 3,086 2,346
Did not meet 2,031 1,263
Total 5,117 3,609
*/**/*** indicate significance at 10%/5%/1% (two-tailed). z-statistics in parentheses are based on White stan-
dard errors. The marginal effects are computed as   eβ'X/(1+ e      β'  where 'X is computed at the mean val-
ues of X (explanatory variables).
The sample consists of 5,117 observations during the period 1994–2002 for 1,154 UK firms meeting the sam-
ple selection criteria. Appendix A defines the variables. All observations outside the interval –£0.02 ≤ SURP <
£0.02 are deleted when JMBE is used, resulting in 1,033 firms and 3,609 observations. SURP is the earnings
surprise measured as the difference between I/B/E/S actual EPS and the latest analyst forecast made prior to
the earnings announcement date.
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a sufficiently large downward revision, results in a
positive earnings surprise is consistent with earn-
ings forecast guidance, whereas a zero or positive
forecast error that, due to a sufficiently large up-
ward forecast revision, results in a negative earn-
ings surprise is inconsistent with earnings forecast
guidance. Bartov et al. argue that absent manage-
ment intervention, the proportion of observations
where the revision offsets the sign of the earnings
surprise should be identical between cases with
negative and positive errors. Results of our addi-
tional tests show that the frequency of negative
forecast errors ending with zero or positive earn-
ings surprises (28%) is substantially higher than
the frequency of positive or zero forecast errors
ending with negative earnings surprises (7%). This
evidence is consistent with earnings forecast guid-
ance to meet analyst expectations, lending further
credence to our core findings.
5.3. Results on classification shifting to meet 
analyst expectations
5.3.1. Main results
Table 5 reports the results of regressions of un-
expected core earnings on non-recurring items for
the entire sample (1,154 firms, 5,117 observations)
and three subsets of firms: (a) firms with income
increasing non-recurring items (962 firms, 2,803
observations); (b) firms where classifications of
non-recurring items allow managers to just hit an-
alyst forecasts (481 firms, 761 observations); and
(c) firms where classifications of small non-recur-
ring items allow managers to just hit analyst fore-
casts (186 firms, 225 observations). Panel A
reports the results of equation (9). To the extent
UK firms engage in classification shifting, we ex-
pect the association between income-increasing
non-recurring items and unexpected core earnings
to be positive and more profound within the sub-
sets of firms that are increasingly likely to engage
in classification shifting to meet analyst expecta-
tions. We find no evidence of a significant associ-
ation between TNRI and unexpected core earnings
(UCE), even focusing on firms where classifica-
tions of small total non-recurring items allow them
to just hit analyst forecasts. Contrary to the find-
ings of McVay (2006) for US firms, these results
suggest that income-increasing total non-recurring
items are not systematically related to the variation
in unexpected core earnings and thus that classifi-
cation shifting is not common practice among UK
firms.
Some firms might have greater incentives or
ability to use classification shifting to meet analyst
expectations. Prior research in the UK suggests
that larger firms are more likely to engage in clas-
sificatory income smoothing to reduce the costs of
public visibility (Beattie et al., 1994). Disclosures
of alternative earnings metrics are pervasive
amongst the 500 largest (based on market capitali-
sation) UK listed non-financial firms (Choi et al.,
2005). Larger firms also experience more frequent
structural changes, which often give rise to non-re-
curring items. We therefore look for evidence of
classification shifting on a subset of larger firms.
We consider larger firms as those in the highest
three quintiles of lagged market capitalisation so
that our subset of larger firms resembles the sam-
ple of Choi et al. (2005). Within this subset the fre-
quency of zero non-recurring items (8%) is
substantially lower than that for the remaining
firms in the sample (16%), consistent with larger
firms disclosing non-recurring items more fre-
quently. Repeating equation (9) for larger firms
where classifications of small total non-recurring
items allow them to just hit analyst forecasts (113
firms, 137 observations), TNRI remains insignifi-
cant.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the results of equation
(11) on the separate components of TNRI (NOEI
and ONRI). As other non-recurring items offer a
more flexible device for classification shifting to
meet analyst expectations than non-operating ex-
ceptional items, we expect the coefficient on ONRI
to be positive. On the entire sample, firms with in-
come-increasing other non-recurring items (962
firms, 2,927 observations) and firms where classi-
fications of other non-recurring items allow man-
agers to just hit analyst forecasts (489 firms, 761
observations), we find no evidence of a significant
association between UCE and income-increasing
ONRI. However, for firms where classifications of
small other non-recurring items allow them to just
hit the forecast (201 firms, 244 observations),
ONRI is positive and significant (0.597, t=2.88).
This is due to larger firms within this sub-sample,
as for larger firms that would have just missed the
target without classifications of small non-recur-
ring items (121 firms, 148 observations) the coef-
ficient on ONRI is positive and significant (0.868,
t=2.06). For these firms, a one standard deviation
increase in other non-recurring items results in an
increase in unexpected core earnings (scaled by
sales) of 26 basis points (0.868, multiplied by
0.003, the standard deviation of other non-recur-
ring items for this sample). Not surprisingly, as the
sample is narrowed to focus on firms that have
greater opportunity to engage in classification
shifting, the adjusted R2 increases from to 0.2% to
1.3%. As expected, we find no evidence of a posi-
tive association between UCE and income-in-
creasing NOEI for any subset of firms.
Summarising, the results in Table 5 provide evi-
dence of a positive association between unexpect-
ed core earnings and small other non-recurring
items for larger firms that met the analyst forecast
by up to two pence per share, when otherwise they
would have just missed the target. This evidence is
Vol. 39 No. 1. 2009 21
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consistent with a subset of larger firms engaging in
classification shifting of small core expenses to
operating exceptional or other non-recurring items
to just meet analyst expectations. On the other
hand, a positive association between UCE and
ONRI may also result from immediate efficiency
gains due to rationalising operations. To distin-
guish between the two scenarios, we next examine
the association between non-recurring items and
future profitability.
Table 6 reports results from regressions of future
changes in unexpected core earnings (UΔCE) on
non-recurring items for the entire sample and the
three subsets of firms that are increasingly likely to
engage in classification shifting to meet analyst
expectations. To the extent UK firms engage in
classification shifting to meet analyst expectations,
we expect the association between non-recurring
items and changes in unexpected core earnings one
year ahead to be negative and more profound for
the sub-samples. Panel A reports the results of
equation (10). For firms where classifications of
small total non-recurring items allow them to just
hit the forecast (155 firms, 178 observations),
TNRI is negative and significant (–0.553, t=–2.28).
The negative association pertains to larger firms
within this subset (94 firms, 113 observations), as
for these firms TNRI is significantly negative and
higher in magnitude (–1.160, t = –3.02).17 This re-
sult is more likely due to the effect of small in-
come-increasing other non-recurring items, as for
larger firms that just hit the analyst forecast with
classifications of these items (Panel B, 102 firms,
120 observations) ONRI is negative (–1.060,
t=–1.68). Combined with the evidence in Table 5,
this finding suggests that for larger firms that just
meet analyst forecasts by shifting small core ex-
penses to other non-recurring items, a one standard
deviation increase in other non-recurring items is
expected to increase unexpected core earnings by
26 basis points and have a subsequent incremental
reversal of about 22 basis points (–1.060 multi-
plied by 0.002) one year ahead. Almost 85%
(22/26) of the increase in unexpected core earnings
reverses in the subsequent period, as these expens-
es recur. Taken together, the results in Tables 5 and
6 provide evidence that a subset of larger firms,
roughly 10% of sample firms (121/1154), engage
in classification shifting of small other non-recur-
ring items to just meet analyst expectations.18
Despite the increase in adjusted R2 for firms that
are more likely to engage in classification shifting,
the explanatory power for all regressions in Tables
5 and 6 is low (0.01%–5.1%). In similar regres-
sions, McVay (2006: 518–521) also reports low
adjusted R2s (0.01%–8.5%), despite her larger
dataset and the stronger evidence of an association
between non-recurring items and unexpected core
profits for US firms. The low explanatory power of
these tests is due to the two-stage process that we
follow, after McVay (2006). For example, in the
first stage given by equation (7) we model expect-
ed core earnings by industry–year; in the second
stage (equation 9) we run a simple regression to
test the association between unexpected core earn-
ings and non-recurring items. This two-stage de-
sign yields a low explanatory power in the second
stage, but our overall ability to explain variation in
core earnings is determined by both the first and
second stages. The low explanatory power of the
second stage is also due to the positive (negative)
association between unexpected core profits and
non-recurring items pertaining to a small subset of
larger firms.
5.3.2. Additional analysis
For a complete assessment of the implications of
non-recurring items for firms that are most likely
to be engaging in classification shifting to meet an-
alyst expectations, we test the association between
non-recurring items and future operating cash
flows:
FutureCFOi,t = λ0 + λ1CEi,t + λ2NOEIi,t + (13)
λ3ONRIi,t + λ4ACCRUALSi,t + λ5GROWTHi,t + ui,t
where FutureCFO is operating cash flows
summed over three years following year t and
scaled by sales. If non-recurring items predict fu-
ture cash flows, the precise timing of this effect in
terms of the window for measuring future cash
flows is uncertain. If managers shift core expenses
to non-recurring items to meet expectations, they
can use strategic disclosures to show higher core
earnings in the short term, but they cannot avoid
negative implications in the long term. As a result,
we sum operating cash flows over three years to
ensure we capture a substantial portion of the pre-
dictive power of non-recurring items. We split
total non-recurring items into NOEI and ONRI to
examine the separate effects of the two compo-
nents. Similar to Doyle et al. (2003), we control
24 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
17 As tests of future unexpected changes in core earnings re-
quire one-year-ahead data, reducing the sample to 941 firms
and 3,968 observations, these results are not directly compa-
rable with results in Table 5, which are calculated on the orig-
inal sample of 1,154 firms and 5,117 observations. Repeating
the analysis in Table 5 on the subset of 3,968 observations
leaves the core findings unaltered.
18 An alternative approach to clustering by year to control
for cross sectional dependence is to use Fama and MacBeth
(1973) across year t-statistics. However, as we run equations
(9)–(12) on gradually narrower subsets of firms (the last sub-
set includes 16 observations on average per year) the
Fama–MacBeth statistics may bias results against finding an
association between income-increasing non-recurring items
and unexpected core profits. Indeed this alternative estimation
yields weaker evidence of classification shifting within the
subset of larger firms that just hit analyst forecast using small
income-increasing other non-recurring items.
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for GROWTH and ACCRUALS. Higher-growth
firms have higher changes in working capital,
which may affect future cash flows. Also higher-
growth firms tend to experience structural events,
which are the major source of non-operating ex-
ceptional items. We add accruals as prior research
shows that they predict future cash flows
(Dechow, 1994; Sloan, 1996; Barth et al., 2001). If
an income-increasing non-recurring item is
booked as an accrual (e.g. asset impairment, pro-
vision for reorganisation costs) in the current peri-
od and turns into a cash outflow in a future period,
then accruals reversal could yield a negative asso-
ciation between non-recurring items and future op-
erating cash flows.
Similar to equations (11) and (12), we estimate
equation (13) for the entire sample and four sub-
sets of firms: (a) firms with income-increasing
other non-recurring items; (b) firms where classi-
fications of other non-recurring items allow man-
agers to just hit analyst forecasts; (c) firms where
classifications of small other non-recurring items
allow managers to just hit analyst forecasts; and
(d) larger firms from subset three (the highest three
quintiles of lagged market capitalisation). If, con-
sistent with evidence in Tables 5 and 6, managers
of larger firms engage in classification shifting of
small core expenses to other non-recurring items
to just meet analyst expectations, then we expect
the coefficient on ONRI, λ3, to be negative for the
fourth subset of firms, capturing the effect of small
recurring expenses on these firms’ operating cash
flows in subsequent accounting periods.
For equation (13), aggregating operating cash
flows three years ahead reduces the sample to 863
firms and 3,427 observations. We mitigate sample
attrition by collecting data on operating cash
flows for 2003 and 2004. Because the dependent
variable in equation (13) aggregates operating
cash flows over three years, it involves overlap-
ping observations. To address serial correlation in
error terms further to cross-sectional dependence,
we estimate standard errors clustered by firm and
year.19 Panel A of Table 7 reports the regression
results. The results show that other non-recurring
items are not associated with future cash flows for
the entire sample, the subset of firms with in-
come-increasing ONRI and the subset of firms
just hitting analyst forecasts with income-increas-
ing ONRI. However, for firms that just hit analyst
forecasts using classifications of small income-in-
creasing ONRI (subset 3, 140 firms, 161 observa-
tions) and larger firms within this subset (subset 4,
86 firms, 98 observations), other non-recurring
items are recurring and consume cash in the fu-
ture. The coefficients on ONRI are negative and
significant for both subset 3 (–16.739, t=–2.69)
and subset 4 (–13.417, t=–2.76). As expected, fu-
ture operating cash flows generally decline with
ACCRUALS. Since CE, NOEI and ONRI capture
net income, the accrual result shows that given net
income, a relatively high level of accruals predicts
lower future cash flows, consistent with the re-
sults from prior research (Dechow, 1994; Sloan,
1996; Barth et al., 2001). More important, AC-
CRUALS control for the mechanical relation be-
tween expenses that accrue in the current period
and turn into cash in the future periods when they
reverse. Therefore, the coefficients on ONRI cap-
ture the incremental cash outflows in the future
beyond the reversing of accrued expenses.
Inspecting the magnitude of the coefficients,
ONRI is significantly higher in absolute value
than CE for the two subsets of firms (3,202 and
3.742 respectively). This is most likely due to the
small size of other non-recurring items within the
two subsets of firms, rather than to a higher de-
gree of permanence of these items compared to
core earnings. Based on standardised regression
coefficients the degree of permanence of core
earnings is substantially higher than that of ONRI
for both subsets of firms. A one standard deviation
increase in CE for the third (fourth) subset of
firms increases future operating cash flows by
56% (63%), while a one standard deviation in-
crease in ONRI for the third (fourth) subset of
firms decreases future operating cash flows by
11% (10%).
Overall, results in Table 7 show that even
though, on average, non-recurring items do not
convey information about future operating per-
formance, for firms that hit the analyst target using
classifications of small other non-recurring items,
these items predict future cash outflows. These re-
sults reinforce our evidence of larger firms engag-
ing in classification shifting of small core expenses
to operating exceptional or other non-recurring
items to just meet analyst expectations.
Vol. 39 No. 1. 2009 27
19 Petersen (2007) suggests that when a model suffers from
both serial correlation in the disturbance terms and cross-sec-
tional dependence, standard errors clustered on two dimen-
sions (time and firm) are unbiased and produce correctly sized
intervals whether the firm effect is permanent or temporary.
We make similar inferences when we estimate the equations
using the Prais-Winsten estimator (feasible generalised least
squares), which corrects for cross-sectional correlation and au-
tocorrelated and heteroscedastic residuals. An alternative ap-
proach to alleviating cross sectionally and serially correlated
error terms is to use Fama and MacBeth (1973) across year 
t-statistics and multiply the traditional standard error by the
Newey–West adjustment factor similar to Doyle et al. (2003).
However, as we run equation (13) on gradually narrower sub-
sets of firms (the last subset includes 12 observations on aver-
age per year) the Fama–MacBeth statistics may bias results
against finding an association between income-increasing
non-recurring items and future cash flows. Indeed this alterna-
tive estimation yields weaker evidence of a negative associa-
tion between other non-recurring items and future cash flows
for firms that just hit analyst forecast using small income-in-
creasing other non-recurring items.
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6. Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the mechanisms UK
firms use to meet analyst expectations. We exam-
ine earnings forecast guidance and two earnings
management mechanisms. The results of our in-
vestigation over the period 1994–2002 show that
downward-guided forecasts increase the probabil-
ity of meeting analyst expectations. Furthermore,
within a small subset of larger firms (based on
market capitalisation), we find evidence consistent
with classification shifting of small other non-re-
curring items to hit analyst earnings forecasts. In
particular, for larger firms that would have just
missed the target without classifications of other
non-recurring items, we find that other non-recur-
ring items are associated with an abnormal rise in
core profits in the current period, an abnormal de-
cline in core earnings in the subsequent period and
operating cash outflows three years ahead. This ev-
idence of classification shifting should be treated
with caution as it pertains only to a narrow subset
of firms, where the explanatory power of non-re-
curring items for excess core earnings is low and is
weaker in some robustness tests. With regard to
the second earnings management mechanism, we
find no evidence of a positive association between
income-increasing AWCAs and the probability of
meeting analyst expectations. Overall, our results
suggest that UK firms are more likely to engage in
earnings forecast guidance or, for a subset of larg-
er firms, in classification shifting than in accruals
management to meet analyst expectations. Our re-
sults corroborate the survey evidence of Choi et al.
(2006) that UK managers are more likely to engage
in earnings forecast guidance to meet earnings
benchmarks than to bear the costs of deploying in-
come-increasing discretionary accounting choices.
Our results have important implications for both
investors and accounting standard setters.
Investors view a zero or positive earnings surprise
as evidence of a well-managed firm, able to both
predict and deliver future earnings. Graham et al.
(2005: 5) remark that, ‘The severe stock market re-
actions to small EPS misses can be explained as
evidence that the market believes that most firms
can “find the money” to hit earnings targets. Not
being able to find one to two cents to hit the target
might be interpreted as evidence of hidden prob-
lems at the firm.’ The market therefore appears to
expect a certain degree of earnings or expectations
management to hit the target. To the extent UK
firms guide analyst forecast down or engage in
classification shifting to make the target attainable,
the question that arises is whether investors take
this into consideration by discounting the market
reward (if any) to meeting analyst expectations.
With regard to accounting standard setters, our
results suggest that under an FRS 3 regime, UK
firms are unlikely to engage in earnings manage-
ment through accruals. This is in line with the orig-
inal intention of the UK regulatory bodies in the
early 1990s to reduce opaque practices of earnings
manipulation. Moreover, while prior research sug-
gests that misclassifications of extraordinary items
were pervasive before the introduction of FRS 3
(Smith, 1992), our results show that the practice of
classification shifting through non-recurring items
was not common post-FRS 3. FRS 3’s rigorous
transparency requirements, especially with regard
to large visible transitory items, contributed to this
effect, as they helped users to ascertain with
greater confidence the nature of the items firms
classify as non-recurring, increasing the cost of
using classification shifting to manage earnings.
While classification shifting was not widespread
post-FRS 3, we find evidence consistent with the
practice within a subset of larger UK firms. This
evidence suggests that despite the transparency re-
straints of FRS 3, there was still scope for shifting
relatively small recurring expenses to operating
exceptional and other non-recurring items. Future
research should assess whether investors can de-
tect classification shifting attempts and impound
their full implications for stock prices. A further
interesting avenue for future research would be to
investigate the effect of large audit firms on the use
of classification shifting to achieve analyst expec-
tations. This avenue could extend to earnings fore-
cast guidance. A factor that needs to be considered
is the extent to which these mechanisms raise au-
ditor suspicion, especially in view of their subtle
nature and the role of auditing relative to other cor-
porate governance mechanisms (e.g. institutional
ownership, managerial ownership, the monitoring
action of non-executive directors, the board of di-
rectors and the audit committee).
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Appendix A
Definition of variables
Variable Definition
ACCRUALS Accruals scaled by sales. Accruals is the difference between adjusted ordinary earnings
(DS210) and operating cash flows from the cash flows statement (DS1015).
AF0 Latest forecast for the year made prior to the earnings announcement date.
ATO Asset turnover defined as total sales over average net operating assets [(NOAt+NOAt–1)/2].
NOA (net operating assets) is the difference between operating assets and operating liabili-
ties. Operating assets is total assets (DS392) minus cash and cash equivalent (DS375).
Operating liabilities is total assets (DS392) less total debt (DS1301), total equity (DS307)
and minority interest (DS176).
CE Core earnings calculated as I/B/E/S actual EPS multiplied by the weighted average number
of shares (both unadjusted for splits to derive the historical figures) and scaled by total sales
(DS104).
CRET Excess monthly return cumulated from the month following the year t-1 earnings an-
nouncement to the month of the year t earnings announcement. Excess return is firm return
less the market return using the FTSE All Shares Index. Returns are collected from the
LSPD 2002.
DOWN Equals 1 if UEF is negative, 0 otherwise. We estimate EF based on prior year earnings and
cumulative returns during the year. Because the estimation process requires two years of
lagged data, the initial estimate of DOWN has many missing observations during our sam-
ple period. We replace missing values with an indicator of negative forecast revisions.
Forecast revision is the difference between the latest forecast (AF0) and the earliest forecast
for the year (following the announcement of prior year’s earnings).
EF Expected latest forecast (AF0).
EPS I/B/E/S reported actual EPS.
FutureCFO Operating cash flow (DS1015) summed over three years following the current accounting
period and scaled by sales.
GROWTH The market value of outstanding shares at the end of the year (DSHMV) divided by book
value of common equity at the end of the year (DS307), similar to Skinner and Sloan (2002).
INDPROD Average annual growth in industrial production (using UKCKYWA-UK industrial produc-
tion index: all production industries) adjusted for inflation (using UKCONPRCF-UK RPI
index).
JMBE Equals 1 if the earnings surprise (SURP) is in the interval 0 ≤ SURP < £0.02, 0 if the earn-
ings surprise is in the interval –£0.02 ≤ SURP < 0.
JUSTMET Equals 1 if the earnings surprise is from £0.00 to £0.02 per share, non-recurring items are
income-increasing and the earnings surprise minus total non-recurring items per share is
negative, 0 otherwise.
LARGER Equals 1 for firms in the highest three quintiles of lagged market capitalisation each year, 0
otherwise.
LIT Equals 1 if the firm belongs to a high risk industry (biotechnology, computers, electronics
and retail), 0 otherwise (see Matsumoto, 2002). High risk industries are Datastream Level 6
BIOTC, CMPSV, INTNT, SOFTW, ELETR, DSCST, ERETL, HARDL, MULTI, SOFTG.
MBE Equals 1 if the earnings surprise (SURP) is zero or positive, 0 otherwise. SURP is the dif-
ference between I/B/E/S actual EPS and the latest forecast for the year made prior to the
earnings announcement date (AFO). In line with Bartov et al. (2002), we choose the latest
forecast to precede the earnings release date by at least three days to ensure knowledge of
the actual earnings figure does not contaminate the forecast.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:19
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
Vol. 39 No. 1. 2009 31
Appendix A
Definition of variables (continued)
Variable Definition
NEG_ΔSALES Equals 1 if ΔSALES is negative, 0 otherwise.
NOEI Non-operating exceptional items adjusted for tax and minority interest (DS1083 – DS1094
– DS1097) and scaled by sales. DS1083 is total non-operating exceptional items and in-
cludes profits or losses on the sale or termination of operations, costs of fundamental reor-
ganisations or restructuring and profits or losses on the sale of fixed assets; DS1094 is tax
on non-operating exceptional items; and DS1097 is the minority interest on non-operating
exceptional items. Datastream records exceptional and extraordinary items as negative when
they are costs or losses and positive when they are revenues or gains. To capture the income-
increasing (decreasing) effect of removing negative (positive) items, we multiply NOEI
by –1.
ONRI Other non-recurring items calculated as the difference between TNRI and NOEI.
POSAWCA Equals 1 if AWCA is positive, 0 otherwise. Abnormal working capital accruals is estimated
using the cross-sectional modified Jones model including lagged return on assets (Kothari,
Leone and Wasley, 2005), deleting industry–year combinations with less than six observa-
tions. We calculate working capital accruals (WCAs) directly from the cash flow statement
as change in debtors (DS448), plus change in inventory (DS444), minus change in creditors
(DS417) and minus other changes in working capital (DS1012). By deriving WCA from the
cash flow statement, we avoid the potential measurement error in accruals derived from the
balance sheet when non-operating events such as mergers, acquisitions and divestitures
occur (Collins and Hribar, 2002).
POSΔEARN Equals 1 if annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS is positive, 0 otherwise.
PROFIT Equals 1 if I/B/E/S actual EPS is positive in the current accounting period, 0 otherwise.
ΔREC Change in accounts receivable (DS448).
ΔREV Change in revenue (DS104).
ROA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (DS1502) over total assets
(DS392).
ΔSALES Change in sales (DS104).
SIZE Decile portfolios formed each year by sorting observations into 10 groups based on lagged
market value of equity (0 is the lowest, 9 the highest decile).
Small ONRI Other non-recurring items (ONRI) are less than median ONRI for firms with positive ONRI.
Small TNRI Total non-recurring items (TNRI) are less than median TNRI for firms with positive TNRI.
TNRI Total non-recurring items calculated as the difference between CE and net income (DS1087)
scaled by sales.
UΔCE Unexpected change in core earnings scaled by sales.
UCE Unexpected core earnings scaled by sales.
UEF Unexpected latest analyst forecast (AF0 – EF).
VREARN Decile portfolios formed each year by sorting R2s from industry (Datastream Level 6) spe-
cific regressions of excess returns (cumulated from the month following the year t–1 earn-
ings announcement to the month of the year t earnings announcement) on annual change in
I/B/E/S actual EPS. Excess returns are firm returns less market returns using the FTSE All
Shares Index. Returns are from the LSPD. We assign the value of 0 to firms in the smallest
decile through to 9 for firms in the largest decile.
WCA Working capital accruals scaled by sales.
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Appendix B
Results on earnings forecast guidance using the initial estimate of DOWN
Panel A: Contingency tables classifying observations based on (1) an indicator of meeting analyst 
forecasts (MBE) or of just meeting analyst forecasts (JMBE); and (2) an indicator of downward-guided
analyst forecasts (DOWN).
DOWN = 0 DOWN = 1 DOWN = 0 DOWN = 1
MBE = 0 883 702 JMBE = 0 530 440
(45.61%) (34.53%) (38.91%) (31.29%)
MBE = 1 1,053 1,331
(54.39%) (65.47%) JMBE = 1 832 966
(61.09%) (68.71%)
Total 1,936 2,033 1,362 1,406
χ2 = 50.75 χ2 = 17.64 
p = <0.001 p = <0.001
Panel B: Logit analysis of the probability of meeting analyst forecasts (MBE= 1, JMBE= 1) as a 
function of indicators of positive abnormal working capital accruals (POSAWCA) and of downward-
guided analyst forecasts (DOWN) and a series of incentives and controls.
MBE JMBE
Predicted Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal 
Variable sign (z-stat) effect (z-stat) effect
Intercept –2.178*** –0.930***
(–9.24) (–3.01)
POSAWCA ? –0.204*** –0.049 –0.118 –0.027
(–2.86) (–1.43)
DOWN + 0.856*** 0.201 0.610*** 0.136
(11.10) (6.73)
PROFIT + 1.206*** 0.293 0.262 0.061
(7.77) (1.13)
POSΔEARN + 1.365*** 0.321 0.997*** 0.230 
(17.12) (10.55) 
VREARN + 0.018 0.004 0.004 0.001 
(1.06) (0.38)
GROWTH + 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.001 
(0.36) (0.48)
LIT + –0.143 –0.034 0.627 0.130 
(–0.14) (0.60)
INDPROD + 6.647*** 1.577 3.806* 0.854
(3.75) (1.70)
SIZE + 0.007 0.002 0.030* 0.007
(0.57) (1.85)
MBEt–1 + 0.346*** 0.083 0.318*** 0.072
(4.65) (3.60)
Industry dummies Yes Yes
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